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ENGLISH JUSTICE BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE GREAT
CHARTER. By Doris M. Stenton. Philadelphia: The American Philo-
sophical Society, Pp. ix, 238.
Gradually we are coming to a fuller and better understanding of
English law and its administration in the Earlier Middle Ages. From
1234 onwards we can trace the pattern with certainty, while before
the reign of Alfred the pattern is indistinct, blurred and often lost to
sight. What of the years between? If there will always be large gaps in
our knowledge because documents fail us, with continued publication
of the records that time has spared us, we shall emerge, not into full
daylight, but still we shall emerge from the twilight in which we have
long groped our way. The last forty years or so have seen valuable new
editions of Anglo-Saxon charters, writs and wills; the revival of the
Pipe Roll Society, and consequently the publication of the Pipe-rolls to
the end of John's reign and a great deal else; many volumes of plea
rolls from the Public Record Office; and other volumes from the Selden
Society and local record societies. A beginning has been made on the
long-neglected task of collecting and editing the charters and writs of
the Norman and Angerin kings. If much remains to be done in render-
ing accessible the wealth of sources in manuscript, it is not too soon to
endeavour to retell the early history of English law with a fuller com-
prehension than was possible to Maitland writing three quarters of a
century ago with less adequate materials. That the material should now
be more adequate is due in large part to the devoted labours of Lady
Stenton, and it is fitting that in a recent volume' she should survey the
period from the Conquest to Magna Carta and give an account of the
additions to our knowledge.
So little that is significant has been written over the last seventy
years, that anyone attemping to follow Maitland is venturing upon
still uncharted seas. He will have one great advantage that Maitland
lacked, Liebermann's monumental edition of the Anglo-Saxon laws;
but very largely he must find his way alone. He will make discoveries,
even in long-printed books; he will see old facts in a new light; he may
be called upon to challenge long-accepted dates, to reject long-accepted
texts; the pattern of events will change under his eyes. But at the end
his will be but a partial view. Another venturer setting sail upon the
same seas will make other discoveries, will arrange facts and events
in a different pattern. I speak from experience, for while Lady Stenton




has been on her own voyage of discovery, Professor Sayles and I have
been on ours; and we have returned with different charts and rather
different pictures of the coasts we have visited. It is therefore inevitable
that I write now as a returned traveller who has followed parallel paths
and who has sometimes beheld the prospect in a different light. And if
I regret that in the course of our journey we could not have had Lady
Stenton's book in our hands, it is perhaps not presumptuous or unkindly
on my part to hope that she may learn something from two volumes of
ours,2 even if it is no more than a small detail that we were fortunate
enough to notice before she did. But I hasten to mention another
venturer, Professor R. C. van Caenegem, whose survey of writs and the
writ process from the Conquest to the end of Henry II's reign appeared
in 1959.3 Mr. van Caenegem is indeed constantly in Lady Stenton's
mind, and a good many of her pages read like a dialogue between the
two scholars. Differing as I do from both of them on a number of points,
I can hardly say who has the better of the argument. My sympathies-
if that is the right word-veer, though my appreciation of their devoted
scholarship is given in equal measure.
Inevitably, if one begins to tell the story of English law from the
Conquest onwards, one must glance at the preceding century. Where
others have seen a great interruption with the coming of the Normans,
Lady Stenton sees continuity. That this is the right view I have no doubt.
The more we learn of the Old English polity, the less we are likely to
rate the extent of the changes after 1066. In law, no less than in all other
aspects of society, there was continuity-granted the initial upheaval
caused by the dispossession of nearly the whole of the high ranking
propertied class. The survival of the shire-court and hundred-court
must imply the survival of the English legal system. The evidence that
Lady Stenton adduces for the survival of the sacrabar points in the same
direction. The local justice, who was certainly in office under William
Rufus, also looks like a survival. And a growing number of scholars
reject Brunner's thesis that the Normans brought the jury with them
and believe that the debt was the other way round. There would seem
to be no doubt about survival, yet when we ask for evidence that the
substantive law, as well as the framework of the law, survived practically
unaltered, we are in some perplexity. It is quite clear that Court's code
was well-known in the twelfth century, but to what extent it wms living
2. RicHARDSON, THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND nom TEi CONQUEsT TO %LkCNA
CARTA (1963); RicCARD oN, LAW AND LEGISLATION IN MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND FROM A"TEL-
BERTH TO MAGNA CARTA (1966).
3. vAN CAENEGE , ROYAL WRiTs TN ENGLAND FROM THE CoNQUEst TO GLANVIU. (1959).
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law is another matter. Again some often repeated beliefs in ancient
survivals we must, I think, reject. Though twelfth-century law-books
speak of the division of the country between three laws, of the West
Saxons, the Mercians and the Danes, this is a piece of antiquarianism.
We can trace this myth to a tract that comes from the reign of the
Confessor. There is, it is true, an earlier reference to the three laws in
Court's code, but solely with reference to royal rights: no reference is
made to customary law. A statement made by an anonymous author
that Middlesex fell within the Dane law and that Kent was subject to
West Saxon law carries its own refutation. No one with real knowledge
of local customs in England could ignore the peculiar customs of Kent,
strongly marked and tenaciously held. The tract-writer was an im-
poster. When we find the same story repeated in law-books of the twelfth
century, we know that the writers have not made diligent enquiry and
that their learning is book-learning.
What then are we to make of these law-books, some so fantastically
wrong-headed that we find it hard to tell their purpose, others with
good grain intermingled with much chaff? Of the impetus that set this
rather murky stream flowing, there can be no doubt. Henry I had given
back to the English the laws of Edward. Well, what were Edward's laws?
He had issued no code and Henry made no effort to ascertain what
exactly he was granting. So a number of private persons took it upon
themselves to supply the lack, and on the whole they made a sorry mess
of the business. But the fabrications once started, there threatened to
be no end to them. There is a spurious Assize of Clarendon. There are
collections of apocrypha. But until the book we know as Glanville was
written, there was no law-book produced that we can call wholly factual.
One group which, with some latitude of language, we can class as
Anglo-Saxon, has been edited with devoted care by Felix Liebermann,
and his text and commentary are an invaluable basis for their study.
Though Liebermann made his mistakes in dating and textual criticism,
his guidance is indispensable and he furnishes the means for his own
correction. Still his work must be approached with caution, and histo-
rians have perhaps been inclined to take too much on trust. As for the
rest of the outpouring of the twelfth century, and especially the assizes,
authentic and unathentic, of Henry II, they await a skilled editor. For
too long scholars have been content with the texts edited by William
Stubbs upon principles very difficult to discern.
What the pre-Glanville law-books do not do is to take notice of the
evolution of the writ process that was going on before their eyes. The
writers live too much in an unreal world. They cannot be altogether
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regardless of the present, but it is a tedious and uncertain task to seek
what is historically valuable amidst so much that is of dubious authority
or merely fictional. For the most part Lady Stenton puts this literature
aside. If she has been misled by her occasional glances at these difficult
texts, it is no great matter. She concentrates upon royal urits and the
royal courts and gives us much to ponder. When, however, she turns in
her fourth chapter to the reign of John, I feel that her tenderness for
the king has sometimes led her astray. I cannot myself see any justifica-
tion for John's closure of the royal courts during his absence in Ireland.
The office of justiciar had been invented for just such an occasion, to se-
cure the continuous administration of justice in the king's absence, and
it had been employed in this way for a century and was later so em-
ployed by John himself. The only reason for his action on this partic-
ular occasion seems to have been his quarrel with the justiciar, Geoffrey
Fitz Peter. Lady Stenton is positive that there was no quarrel; but she
gives no adequate explanation of the king's failure to employ the
justiciar when his services were most needed, and she dismisses the
evidence of the Minstrel of Bethune with an assurance I cannot share.
Our difference appears to be largely due to her conception of the
nature of the office of justiciar and the functions he performed before
John was expelled from Normandy and became a stay-at-home monarch.
This is illustrated, not only by her discussion of Geoffrey Fitz Peter,
but also by her discussion of Ralf Basset, who is put forward as an
occupant of the office under Henry I, though in what relation he stood
to Roger of Salisbury is not explained. His activity as a judge is beside
the point. What distinguishes Roger is that he is quite evidently the
king's alter ego, issuing writs in his own name during the king's absence.
Where are Ralf Basset's writs? Where is the testimony to his authority,
such as we have from Bishop Herbert of Losinga, witnessing to his pre-
eminence? And how could there possibly be room for a rival or partner
to Roger? The history of the justiciarship has been obscured by much
ill-advised conjecture and it is important to get the outline straight.
The creation of the Exchequer and the office of justiciar was the essen-
tial feature in the organization of the judicature and the establishment
of an impersonal monarchy, which distinguished England and Nor-
mandy from all other contemporary states. This sudden leap forward
put Henry and his advisors in a place apart in the history of politics and
from it sprung much that is peculiar to the English system of justice.
This is not the only or, perhaps, the principal point of difference
between my view of the evolution of English justice and Lady Stenton's.
I should emphasise the importance of the structure given to the judi-
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cature, which seems to me fundamental to the changes that overtook
the writ process. Lady Stenton lays great stress upon the change in the
general form of twelfth-century writs which, to begin with, were
commands to the sheriff to take action and did not follow the matter
up further but which, under Henry II, required the writ to be returned
to the king's court so that right might be done. The change is explicable
if we consider the nature of the judicature under Henry I, Stephen
and Henry II. The first and greatest of the justiciars, Roger of Salisbury,
worked wonders in organizing an efficient system of justice. In outline
it was much what we find under Henry II. There was created a per-
manent central court at the Exchequer and a corps of justices available
not only to sit at the Exchequer but also to make frequent visitations
throughout the country. These justiciaris totius Anglie supplemented
and in large measure supplanted the local justice, but they were admin-
istrators rather than lawyers, and the jury-though as an institution
more than a century old, if not much older-was in an early stage of
its evolution. The course of events under Stephen is obscure, but there
can be no doubt that the administration of justice went to pieces.
Henry II's persistence in denying validity to any of Stephen's acts and
an inevitable loss of documents meant a break in continuity that will
leave historians always in ignorance. There can, however, have been
little worth continuing in the make-shift arrangements which were
all that were possible in a politically divided country, Henry II insisted
upon getting back to the conditions of his grandfather's day. He was
more than successful in this, for his ministers developed a judicial sys-
tem in advance of anything yet known in England or on the continent.
The judges became more professional; the jury became organised and
flexible. It took twelve years and more to achieve this, for the first
experiment-we can hardly call it more-of 1166 was not a successful
trial of an imperfect organisation. Not until 1168 were Henry II's re-
forms put upon a firm basis. With effective machinery available for the
enforcement of the law, the writs already available and to be invented
could be systematised step by step, but the process occupied another
decade.
It is evident that there was no master plan from the beginning: one
expedient followed another, always resting upon precedent, but so
contrived as to fit into what has the appearance of a predestined place
in a scheme of actions. Luck or cunning? Perhaps Roman law had its
influence, but rather as an inspiration than as a source of substantive
law. It is no longer possible to see-as was for long believed-an
affiliation between the assize of novel disseisin and the interdict unde vi.
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It is more certain that the actio iniuriarum helped to shape the action
of trespass which--explain the omission as we may-finds no place
in Glanville. There are many parallels between Roman law and the
common law, but little evidence of direct borrowing in the twelfth
century. The important fact is, however, that the law in Glanville,
which comes from the last years of Henry III's reign is very new law
and, whatever roots it may have in the past, English or Roman, it
represents the achievement of little more than twenty years. But while
I must obviously agree with Lady Stenton when she stresses the novelty
of the writ system as it evolved in Henry II's reign, I differ from her
by agreeing with Mr. van Caenegem that the earliest writs giving seisin
or requiring reseisin-to take these as examples--are the ancestors of
the later writ of novel disseisin. The concept of law did not change;
but the means, and therefore the method, of giving effect to that con-
cept did change.
The evil genius that dogged John's footsteps all his life brought to
an end the system created by Henry I and Roger of Salisbury. The loss
of Normandy rendered the office of justiciar an anomaly, though it
took a generation for the grim fact to be realised and the office did not
finally lapse until 1234. John's foolish quarrel with the barons led,
curiously enough, to the preservation of what was, in effect, the justi-
ciar's court when the justiciar himself disappeared. John, of course,
repudiated the concessions he had made to the barons when granting
the Great Charter, among them his acceptance of their demand that
common pleas should not follow the king's court but should be held
at a definite place-a reference to the practice of the justiciars in pre-
vious reigns. Had John lived, it is unlikely that England would ever
have known the illogical division of the judicature between the King's
Bench and the Common Bench, with the Exchequer still retaining
some small share of the common law jurisdiction that the justiciar had
formerly exercised. This was part of the price that the supporters of
Henry III paid for the boy-king's succession. Though the arrangement
endured for six centuries, it cannot be praised as a well planned instru-
ment of justice. Englishmen, however, accepted it, because they became
used to it, and they thought so well of it that they transplanted it in
Ireland. In 1234 when the courts were reorganised, the writ system,
as it evolved since the reign of Henry II, was still young and simple;
but it had become integrated in the concept of English justice and no
one conceived of any alternative. So the system continued and pro-
liferated and did not improve with growth and age, as an acquaintance
with the printed Register of Writs will convince any reader. Perhaps
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we should not call this process decadence; but if we wish to see English
justice at its best, we would do well to contemplate it before the con-
vulsions of John's reign had twisted and contorted what had been
conceived and completed in a land of peace. Think how simple the
organisation of justice is as Glanville presents it.4 The treatise is con-
cerned only with the king's court at the Exchequer and the courts of
the itinerant justices. Of a court coram rege the author takes no notice,
for to him a separate and distinct court of that sort is not conceivable.
Doubtless if the king were so minded, he might preside over his own
court at the Exchequer; but he was rarely so minded, and for most
of his time he was out of the country. With an impersonal monarchy,
his absence did not mean any diminution in the authority of his courts.
A strong justiciar was more than a match even for the mischief-making
Count John. Alasl Richard's death brought John to power. Had he
been a prudent ruler, he would not have disturbed the simple effi.
ciency of the English courts. But to John prudence was no more than
an occasional visitor.
H. G, RICHARDSON
4. The latest edition, of the hitherto unpublished alpha text, by G. D . Hall has an
instructive introduction, translation and critical notes (Edinburgh, 1965).
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